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review by OMB’s Office of Information and
1
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). Importantly, the
memorandum instructs Treasury to give OIRA a
formal cost-benefit analysis of any regulatory
action that has an annual non-revenue effect on
the economy of $100 million or more. Regulations
that create interagency inconsistencies or raise
“novel” legal or policy issues are also subject to
OIRA review. For these “significant” regulations,
the memorandum requires a less formal costbenefit analysis.
These new mandates require Treasury and
OIRA to adapt the tools of cost-benefit analysis to
the tax context. The primary effect of many tax
regulations is a change in the amount that
taxpayers transfer to the government. Traditional
cost-benefit analysis considers transfers from one
party to another to be neither social costs nor
social benefits. Without some way to account for
the social welfare effects of changes in tax
collections, however, Treasury and OIRA face the
challenge of applying the new cost-benefit
analysis mandate in a consistent and sensible
manner.
We propose a method of performing costbenefit analysis of tax-related regulations. Under
this approach, which we call the marginal revenue
rule (MRR), the social benefit of a revenue increase
generated by a tax regulation is equal to the net
increase in revenue resulting from reporting and
2
behavioral changes induced by the regulation.

I. Introduction
In April, Treasury and the Office of
Management and Budget released a
memorandum of agreement stating that taxrelated regulations will be subject to centralized

1

“Memorandum of Agreement, Department of the Treasury and
Office of Management and Budget Review of Tax Regulations Under
Executive Order 12866” (Apr. 11, 2018) (April 2018 MOA). See also
Executive Order 12866, section 6(a)(3)(B) and (C) (Sept. 30, 1993).
2

Correspondingly, the social cost of any decrease in revenue resulting
from a tax regulation is equal to the net decrease in revenue resulting
from behavioral and reporting changes.
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The total social benefit of a tax regulation thus
equals the net increase in revenue resulting from
reporting and behavioral changes plus any nonrevenue-based benefits (for example, health
benefits from a tobacco tax regulation or
environmental benefits from a gas tax regulation).
The social cost of a tax regulation is the net
increase in administrative and compliance costs
resulting from the regulation, as well as any nontax-related costs (for example, health and
environmental costs). The net effect of the
regulation is the difference between the social
benefits and the costs.
The MRR has several advantages. It is firmly
rooted in the economic theory of taxation. While
that theory independently drives our approach,
the MRR is also consistent with the principles
underlying Circular A-4, OMB’s decades-old
guidance for agency cost-benefit analysis. To be
sure, Circular A-4 could easily be amended to
address tax regulations, but it conveniently need
not be. Finally, the MRR builds on the revenueestimating competencies that already exist within
the Treasury Office of Tax Analysis (OTA) and
other parts of the executive and legislative
branches.
At the same time, the MRR is not a decision
rule, nor is any cost-benefit analysis of tax
3
regulations. We do not expect Treasury and the
IRS to adopt all regulations for which benefits
exceed costs, and we expect them to adopt some
regulations for which costs exceed benefits. This is
so for at least two reasons. First, tax systems create
deadweight losses by design. They are chosen to
balance the efficiency losses with other benefits,
such as the distributional benefits or the need to
raise tax revenue for the provision of public
goods. In particular, our choice to have an income
tax rather than relying solely on a head tax reflects
a recognition that non-efficiency considerations
— specifically, the goal of distributing tax burdens
based on ability to pay — justify the efficiency
losses of taxing income. Yet even in those cases,

3

A tax regulation, like any other regulation, might be set aside if it
“entirely fails to consider costs and benefits” when the underlying
statute can be read to require such consideration. See Michigan v. EPA,
135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015). The mandate to consider costs does not,
however, mean that Treasury and the IRS must determine that
monetized benefits exceed monetized costs before promulgating a
regulation. Id. at 2711.
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the MRR can shed light on the efficiency
implications of the regulation in question,
allowing other executive branch officials,
members of Congress, and the public to evaluate
whether the non-efficiency arguments in favor of
the action outweigh the efficiency costs.
Second, in some cases a statute may compel
Treasury and the IRS to adopt an inefficient
regulation or may preclude them from taking an
action that cost-benefit analysis recommends.
Although the MRR does not free Treasury and the
IRS from following congressional commands, it
can assist lawmakers in assessing whether the
statutory mandate in question merits
amendment.
Moreover, the MRR does not resolve all the
issues that Treasury, the IRS, and OIRA must
tackle to adapt cost-benefit analysis to tax
regulations. It does not, for example, address the
threshold question of how to determine when a
regulation has an annual non-revenue effect on
the economy of $100 million or more — thus
triggering the need for a regulatory impact
analysis. Rather, when that criterion has been met
as determined by OIRA, the MRR provides a
method for performing the required analysis.
Another challenge for agencies is how to separate
the effects of the relevant statute from the effects
of the regulation under consideration. This
baseline problem is not unique to tax, but it is
something that those performing a cost-benefit
analysis of tax regulations will encounter
frequently because many tax statutes are selfexecuting (that is, they will take effect regardless
of whether Treasury and the IRS issue
implementing rules). The MRR does not itself
address this question, although other guidance
4
does. What the MRR does — and we think does
well — is give the agencies a way to evaluate the
efficiency implications of revenue changes arising
from regulatory actions.

4

Circular A-4 states: “In some cases, substantial portions of a rule
may simply restate statutory requirements that would be selfimplementing, even in the absence of the regulatory action. In these
cases, you should use a pre-statute baseline. If you are able to separate
out those areas where the agency has discretion, you may also use a
post-statute baseline to evaluate the discretionary elements of the
action.” Circular A-4, at 15-16.
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II. The Challenge for Tax Regulators
Cost-benefit analysis has played an important
role in nontax regulation for decades. Every
president since Ronald Reagan has required that
executive agencies evaluate the costs and benefits
5
of regulatory actions. The current regime of
centralized OIRA review dates back to President
Clinton’s Executive Order 12866, signed in
6
September 1993. That order requires executive
agencies to assess the potential costs and benefits
of any “significant” regulatory action7 and
provide a more formal regulatory impact analysis
for those deemed “economically significant”
(expected to have an annual economic effect of at
8
least $100 million). Regulatory impact analysis
includes, to the extent feasible, a quantification
and monetization of the anticipated costs and
benefits of the regulatory action and its potential
9
alternatives.
Rarely, however, has OIRA reviewed taxrelated regulations drafted by Treasury and the
IRS according to the standards for economically
significant regulatory actions.10 A 1983
memorandum of agreement between Treasury
and OMB explicitly exempted revenue rulings
and revenue procedures from centralized
11
review, and the Internal Revenue Manual says

5

See Executive Order 12291 (Feb. 17, 1981) (revoked 1993).

6

President George W. Bush made several substantive amendments to
the order two years before he left office (see Executive Order 13422 (Jan.
18, 2007) (revoked 2009)), but those were withdrawn by President
Obama in the second week of his first term (see Executive Order 13497
(Jan. 30, 2009)).
7

Executive Order 12866, sections 3(f) and 6(a)(3)(B). A regulatory
action is deemed significant if it is likely to result in a rule that (1) may
have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or may
adversely affect an economic sector or a state, local, or tribal
government; (2) may interfere with an action by another agency; (3) may
materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlement programs; or (4)
may raise novel legal or policy issues.
8
9

Id. at section 3(f)(1).

that tax regulations are generally exempt from
cost-benefit analysis requirements.12
All of that has now changed. As noted earlier,
the April memorandum of agreement between
Treasury and OIRA set forth a new framework for
review of tax regulations under Executive Order
12866. The memorandum states that tax
regulatory actions will be subject to OIRA review
if they are likely to interfere with other agency
actions, raise novel legal or policy issues, or “have
an annual non-revenue effect on the economy of
$100 million or more, measured against a noaction baseline.”13 Actions in the last category —
those likely to have a non-revenue economic effect
of at least $100 million — must be accompanied
by a regulatory impact analysis.14 OIRA generally
will have 45 days to conduct its review, with an
expedited 10-day process available for
regulations implementing the Tax Cuts and Jobs
15
Act (P.L. 115-97).
The extension of the cost-benefit analysis
mandate to tax regulations will raise a number of
difficult issues for Treasury, the IRS, OMB, and
OIRA to resolve. Chief among them is the
challenge of incorporating revenue effects into
cost-benefit analysis. Circular A-4 states that “the
revenue collected through a . . . tax is a transfer
payment.”16 Transfer payments, according to
Circular A-4, are “monetary payments from one
group to another that do not affect total resources
available to society.”17 Circular A-4 might thus be
read to suggest that a change in tax revenue as a
result of a regulation ought not to be counted as a
benefit or a cost. In that case, many tax regulations
would have no costs or benefits other than their
changes in compliance and administrative costs.
A sounder interpretation, however, would
recognize that Circular A-4 defines transfers only
as payments from one group to another that,

12

Id. at section 6(a)(3)(C); see also Circular A-4, at 1-2 and 6-9.

10

A search of OIRA’s website for “economically significant”
regulations submitted by the IRS yields only six results: a 1997 rule
addressing health insurance portability for group health plans; another
1997 rule involving the HIPAA Mental Health Parity Act; a 1998 rule
implementing the Newborns’ and Mothers’ Health Protection Act; a
2011 regulation regarding return preparers; a 2016 rule designed to
prevent multinational corporations from engaging in earnings stripping
through related-party debt; and a 2017 rule updating mortality tables for
pension-related purposes.

The IRS’s rationale was that (1) the amount of taxes imposed or
collected under a regulation is not counted toward the $100 million
threshold, and (2) “the effect from a rule in most IRS/Treasury
regulations is almost always a result of the underlying statute, rather
than the regulation itself.” IRM section 32.1.5.4.7.5.3 (effective Oct. 15,
2015).
13
14
15
16

11

See “Memorandum of Agreement, Treasury and OMB
Implementation of Executive Order 12991,” at 3 (Apr. 29, 1983).

17

April 2018 MOA, supra note 1, at 1 (emphasis added).
Id.
See id. at 1-2.
OMB Circular A-4, at 14.
Id. at 38.
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again, “do not affect total resources available to
society.” By implication, payments that do affect
total social resources are appropriate to consider
as part of an agency’s cost-benefit analysis.
Because some increases in tax revenue reflect
changes in real resource use, the rationale
underlying Circular A-4 in fact suggests that
those revenue increases should be counted as a
benefit. OIRA’s most recent annual cost-benefit
reports to Congress further support this
interpretation.18 The reports “recognize that . . .
transfer rules may create social benefits or costs.”
For example, transfers “may impose real costs on
society to the extent that they cause people to
change behavior, either by directly prohibiting or
mandating certain activities, or, more often, by
altering prices.” OIRA accordingly “encourages
agencies to report these costs and benefits for
19
transfer rules.”
The MRR reflects these insights by
distinguishing tax payments that reflect a change
in total resources from those that are mere
transfers. In this manner, the MRR provides a
method for incorporating revenue-based social
benefits into a standard regulatory impact
analysis.
III. The Marginal Revenue Rule
The MRR translates recent advances in
economic theory into a tractable tool for
evaluating the costs and benefits of tax
regulations. It builds on the work of economists
20
21
such as Martin Feldstein, Raj Chetty, and
22
Michael Keen and Joel Slemrod, among others,
who have investigated the effects of taxation and
tax administration in related contexts. It also
leverages revenue-estimating capabilities refined

18

These reports are required by the Regulatory Right to Know Act.
See “OIRA Reports to Congress” (archiving reports and draft reports
from October 1999 to December 2016).
19

OMB, “2016 Draft Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of
Federal Regulations and Agency Compliance With the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act,” at 22 (Dec. 23, 2016).
20

See Feldstein, “Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the
Income Tax,” 81 Rev. Econ. & Statistics 674 (1999).
21

Chetty, “Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate
Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance,” 1 Am.
Econ. J.: Econ. Pol’y 31 (2009).
22

Keen and Slemrod, “Optimal Tax Administration,” 152 J. Pub. Econ.
133 (2017).
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by economists at OTA, the Joint Committee on
Taxation, and the Congressional Budget Office
over the past several decades.
The formal basis for the MRR is based on the
papers cited above. Rather than developing the
MRR formally, we illustrate the intuition using a
series of examples. We start with the simplest case
— a single taxpayer who has flexibility regarding
the number of hours that she works — and then
extend it to several closely related cases. After
developing the core principle in these simple
settings, we consider how the MRR can consider
the distributional effects of regulations. We go on
to discuss more complex cases and examine
limitations on the scope of the MRR.
A. Basic Cases
1. Behavioral changes.
Consider a taxpayer who can earn $100 before
taxes for an additional hour of work and who is
subject to a 30 percent tax on her income. If the
taxpayer does not work the additional hour, she
can enjoy an hour of untaxed leisure time. Our
taxpayer will choose to work an additional hour
only if the after-tax return from the additional
hour — $70 — is worth more to her than the
additional hour of leisure. As she works more and
has less time off, each hour of leisure becomes
more valuable to her. She will continue working
additional hours until the benefit of the last
additional hour exactly equals the cost of the
forgone leisure. If this were not true, she could be
better off by changing her behavior.
For example, if an hour of leisure is worth
more than $70 to her, she is working too hard and
can be better off by working a little bit less and
enjoying more leisure time. If an hour of leisure
time is worth less than $70, she would be better off
working a little bit harder and having additional
income and less leisure time. As a result, she will
set her work schedule so that she is indifferent
between the following two options: (1) working
an additional hour, earning an additional $100,
and paying $30 in taxes; and (2) spending the
additional hour on leisure instead.
Now consider a change to a tax rule that
causes the taxpayer to work one additional hour
and to have one less hour of leisure time (for
example, the rule might lower the effective tax
rate that she faces on her next hour of work).
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Because she was indifferent between an
additional hour of work and an additional hour of
leisure, working an extra hour has no effect on her
welfare. The additional hour of leisure she gave
up was worth exactly the $70 of after-tax income
23
she now earns by working the additional hour.
The fact that our illustrative taxpayer is no
worse off as a result of the intervention does not
mean that society is indifferent as to whether the
taxpayer works. Her decision to work an
additional hour raises government receipts by
$30. That revenue, in turn, could be used to
provide additional public goods or to reduce
other taxes.
The MRR instructs that the additional $30 of
revenue be counted as a social benefit — and not
a mere transfer — because society is $30 better off
and the taxpayer is in approximately the same
position as she was before. In cost-benefit terms,
the regulation has a net benefit of $30 because our
taxpayer is no worse off but there is $30 of
additional revenue. Recall that Circular A-4’s
direction that “transfer payments . . . do not affect
24
total resources available to society” does not
apply to this case because the taxpayer’s decision
to work an additional hour does affect total
resources available to society (indeed, it increases
total resources by $30).
It may seem unintuitive that a person who
pays an additional $30 in tax is not worse off. In
general, people are individually worse off when
they have to pay additional taxes. The MRR does
not require a belief otherwise — that is, it does not
imply that people are better off when they pay
more in taxes. Nor does it require a belief that
raising taxes is a good (or bad) thing. It simply
requires an assumption that if a taxpayer
previously was indifferent between (A) devoting
an additional hour to leisure and (B) working an
extra hour, earning $100, and paying $30 in taxes,
she is no worse off when she reallocates one hour
from (A) to (B) (that is, from leisure to labor). She
has $70 in additional after-tax income, and this
compensates her for the hour less of leisure time

23

In economic terms, the regulatory change has no first-order effects.
It may, however, have second-order effects. That is, the regulatory
change will not directly affect her welfare, but it will change the set of
choices she faces in the future.
24

OMB Circular A-4, at 38.

that she has. Society benefits because her extra
work leads her to pay additional taxes, which can
then be used to provide more public goods or to
reduce other taxes.
The example considered a choice between
working and leisure time, but the same logic
holds for other choices that taxpayers make. For
instance, suppose that our taxpayer is choosing
between working in the formal (taxable) sector of
the economy and working in the informal
(untaxed) sector. The untaxed sector includes
both businesses that improperly fail to report
income (such as cash businesses) and work that is
simply untaxed (such as housework and child
care).
Once again, the taxpayer will allocate time
and effort so that the after-tax returns in the two
sectors are equal. If the tax rate is 30 percent, our
taxpayer whose wage rate in the formal sector is
$100 per hour will be indifferent between (1)
working an additional hour in the informal sector
and paying zero in taxes, and (2) working an
additional hour in the formal sector, earning $100,
and paying $30 in taxes. Thus, a change to a tax
rule that makes informal-sector labor slightly less
attractive — and therefore causes the taxpayer to
reallocate one unit of labor from the informal
sector to the formal sector — will have no effect on
that taxpayer’s well-being but will yield a social
benefit in the form of greater revenue. As with the
choice between labor and leisure, the MRR
instructs that the marginal increase in revenue
resulting from the change in taxpayer behavior be
counted as a benefit in the cost-benefit calculus.
The examples above involved changes in
taxpayer behavior (that is, how many hours the
taxpayer works, and whether that work is in the
formal or informal sector). The same insight
applies to decisions about reporting (that is,
whether the taxpayer truthfully reveals income to
the IRS). The reason is that regardless of whether
it is behavior or reporting, the taxpayer makes
choices so that she is indifferent between her
options. If she is not, she is leaving money on the
table.
To illustrate: Imagine again that the tax rate is
30 percent and that a taxpayer is deciding
whether to report a $100 item of income. A
taxpayer at the margin is indifferent between the
two options (that is, not reporting and reporting).
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For example, it might cost $30 for the taxpayer to
set up an offshore bank account that allows her to
hide the item of income from tax authorities. She
is thus indifferent between bearing the $30 cost of
evasion and paying the $30 tax. Or perhaps she is
worried about potential criminal penalties for
evasion, and the disutility of the potential penalty
multiplied by the probability of punishment is
equal to the $30 cost of paying the tax. Or perhaps
the taxpayer experiences some “moral disutility”
from not complying with the law, to which she
assigns the same weight as the $30 tax. The key
point is that for taxpayers at the margin,
interventions that affect reporting — like
interventions that affect other behaviors — have
no effect on the taxpayer’s utility but do have
effects on government revenue. Therefore, under
the MRR, an increase in revenue resulting from a
change in reporting should be considered a
benefit for cost-benefit purposes.
2. Transfers.
Suppose that instead of a single taxpayer,
there are now many taxpayers, and consider a
regulation that increases the probability that a
taxpayer’s failure to report a particular item of
income will be detected. Some individuals will
fail to report the item of income regardless of the
new regulation. They are what we might call
“inframarginal” evaders. Other individuals are
“inframarginal compliers” — that is, they will
report the item of income honestly whether or not
the new regulation is in place. Marginal taxpayers
are those who shift from not reporting to
reporting as a result of the new rule.
The new regulation will generate revenue
from two sources: (1) marginal taxpayers who
shift from not reporting to reporting; and (2)
inframarginal evaders who continue not to report
but now are more likely to be caught. The increase
in revenue from marginal taxpayers is a net social
benefit. Because those taxpayers were close to
indifferent between evading and complying
before, the shift from evasion to compliance has
approximately no effect on their utility, but it
improves social welfare by raising revenue. By
contrast, the MRR treats the increase in revenue
from inframarginal evaders as a transfer — not as
a net social cost or net social benefit. The reason is
that the inframarginal evaders (who under the
new regulation are caught and must pay taxes)
1512

are worse off by the additional taxes they must
pay. Therefore, the cost to the inframarginal
evader offsets the revenue gain.
3. Compliance and administrative cost.
Our examples so far have ignored tax
compliance and administrative costs, focusing
only on the benefits of revenue-raising
regulations (or, conversely, only on the cost side of
regulations that lead to revenue losses). Tax
collection is never costless, however, and costbenefit analysis should take those costs into
account. Paying accountants, lawyers, and return
preparers, keeping records, filling out forms, and
so forth, are all real costs that our tax system
imposes on society, as are the costs of running the
IRS. Indeed, Circular A-4 explicitly recognizes
“private sector compliance costs” as well as
“government administrative costs” as important
estimates to include in a regulatory impact
25
analysis.
Consider again our single taxpayer who is
indifferent between an additional hour of work in
the informal sector and an additional hour of
work in the formal sector. Imagine that now she is
subject to a new regulation that is costly to comply
with — say, a rule that forces her to keep
additional records — but that also makes it more
likely that informal-sector income will be detected
by the IRS. As a result of the deterrence effect of
the new regulation, she shifts an additional hour
from the informal sector to the formal sector.
Although she is no worse off from that shift, the
compliance costs from keeping additional records
do make her worse off. Keeping the records is an
additional cost she must bear that she did not
have to bear before the change to the regulation.
Therefore, if a regulation raises compliance costs
on private individuals or businesses, those
compliance costs reduce the net benefits of the
regulation.
The same holds true for administrative costs
borne by the IRS. Those are real costs that
someone must pay for. Those costs also count
against any benefits of a regulation. That is, in
evaluating a revenue-raising regulation’s overall
effect on social welfare, the net increase in
revenue resulting from reporting and behavioral
25

Id. at 37.
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changes should be compared with the net increase
in administrative and compliance costs. If the
regulation has non-revenue-based effects, of
course, those costs and benefits should also be
included as part of a traditional regulatory impact
analysis. In other words, although the MRR
allows analysts to isolate the social benefits of
increases in revenue resulting from reporting and
behavioral changes, those revenue effects are not
the only possible benefits of tax regulations, and it
is the sum total of benefits (rather than exclusively
the revenue-related benefits) that should be
compared with the costs.
For example, regulations related to the
taxation of alcohol and tobacco products may
affect the incidence of cancer and other diseases.
Those health effects should be incorporated into
the cost-benefit analysis of alcohol and tobacco
tax regulations just as health effects are
incorporated into the cost-benefit analysis of
nontax regulations. OIRA and executive agencies
have decades of experience in evaluating the costs
and benefits of health, safety, and environmental
regulations. The MRR supplements but does not
supplant the use of well-developed analytical
tools to assess the non-revenue costs and benefits
of regulations.
We are now at a point where we can state the
core insight of MRR: In a cost-benefit analysis of
tax rules or regulations, (1) the net increase in
revenue attributable to behavioral or reporting
changes should be counted as a social benefit; (2)
the revenue-related benefits should be added to
any non-revenue-related benefits of the
regulation; (3) the total social benefits (revenuerelated and non-revenue-related) should be
compared with the total social costs, including
administrative and compliance costs; and (4)
changes in taxes paid by inframarginal taxpayers
(those who do not change their behavior or
reporting) should be treated as transfers rather
than as benefits or costs. If the total social benefits
exceed the social costs, the regulation passes the
cost-benefit test.
B. The Value of Government Revenue
The earlier analysis did not adjust the costbenefit calculation for the social value of any
change in tax revenue. It thus implicitly assumed
that the value of that revenue in the government’s

hands is the same as it is in the hands of taxpayers.
We also did not adjust the analysis for
distributional impacts — that is, how the
regulation affects the rich versus the poor.
Tax regulations, more than other regulations,
are likely to affect overall government revenue
and the distribution of tax burdens. The very
purpose of the tax law is to finance the
government and to do so by imposing the burden
in an appropriate manner. Although questions
about the appropriate size of government and
distributive issues are inevitably contentious, any
cost-benefit analysis of tax regulations ultimately
must deal with them because of their centrality to
26
taxation.
We provide a brief discussion of these issues
here, outlining the implications of different
approaches. We argue that the MRR is flexible
enough to accommodate different views on the
size of government and distributive matters, but
also that one way to resolve them is to require taxrelated cost-benefit analyses to separately state
the efficiency, distributional, and revenue effects
of the regulation. The MRR, under this approach,
measures the efficiency effects. We provide a
more complete discussion and a presentation of
our own views on the proper treatment of
transfers due to tax regulations in the online
27
Appendix.
For ease of exposition, we use the letter g to
denote the ratio of (1) the value of $1 in the
government’s hands to (2) the value of $1 in
private hands. If g > 1, the value of $1 in the
government’s hands is greater than the value of $1
in private hands, and pure transfers from private
parties to the government increase social welfare.
If g < 1, the value of $1 in the government’s hands
is less than the value of $1 in private hands, and
pure transfers from private parties to the
government reduce social welfare. Our earlier

26

In fact, many otherwise desirable tax regulations may seem to fail
cost-benefit analysis if we look only at the efficiency effects and demand
that the benefits outweigh the costs. The reason is that taxes create
deadweight losses, and regulations that increase tax payments, as many
do and should, will often increase deadweight loss. This is not true
uniformly. For example, base-broadening regulations and regulations
that sufficiently reduce administrative or compliance costs may on net
be cost-benefit positive even if they increase tax payments.
27

See Daniel Hemel, Jennifer Nou, and David Weisbach, “Appendix
to ‘The Marginal Revenue Rule in Cost-Benefit Analysis’” (Aug. 13,
2018).
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treatment of transfers implicitly set g = 1, but we
recognize that a range of values may be
reasonable.
With that notation, we make four points:
First, the marginal revenue rule can be
tailored to any value of g. To do so, an analyst
would calculate the sum of (1) the change in
revenue resulting from behavioral and reporting
changes and (2) the total change in revenue
multiplied by g - 1. This approach would be
consistent with the MRR’s instruction that
revenue resulting from behavioral and reporting
changes be treated differently in cost-benefit
analysis than revenue resulting from pure
transfers.
Second, setting g = 1 means that the MRR tells
us whether a change to a regulation increases or
reduces total resources available to society. The
reason is that transfers between taxpayers and the
government do not directly affect total resources,
while changes in revenue resulting from
behavioral or reporting responses do. By focusing
only on the latter, the MRR measures whether a
regulation changes total resources. That is, with g
= 1, the MRR is a measure of the efficiency of a
regulation.
Third, the implications of setting g at a value
other than 1 are complex and depend on several
empirical facts and normative views. For
example, some have argued that revenue in the
hands of the government should be valued
differently than in the hands of taxpayers to
28
account for the distortionary effects of taxation.
We might require $1 in the government’s hands to
be worth more than $1 in the taxpayers’ hands
because taxing income leads to deadweight loss.
On this view, the only way to rationalize
government spending is if $1 of government
spending produces more than $1 of social
benefits, because otherwise there would be no
reason to impose a distortionary income tax
rather than a lump sum tax. Another way to state

the claim is that an additional $1 in the hands of
the government can be used to offset $1 that
otherwise would be raised through distortionary
income taxation, thereby producing more than $1
of social benefit because of the deadweight loss
that it avoids.
Our choice to have an income tax, however,
reflects a balance between the distortions that it
causes (such as reduced work effort and reduced
savings) and the distributive benefits (that is,
ensuring that those with a higher ability to pay
will pay more taxes). The optimal income tax
would be set such that the distortionary costs of
an additional $1 of taxation precisely equal the
distributive benefits. If those two effects were
perfectly balanced, the value of $1 in the hands of
29
the government would be $1.
Choosing a value of g other than 1 would
reflect views on whether the current income tax
appropriately balances the redistributive benefits
with the efficiency costs. Some might think the tax
system redistributes too much, in which case they
would value $1 in the government’s hands at more
than $1 because any additional government
revenue could be used to reduce the distortionary
effect of the income tax. Some might think the
reverse, in which case they would value a $1 lump
sum transfer from a private party to the
government at less than $1 because they would
prefer for that revenue to be raised through a
redistributive income tax instead.30
Setting g at a value other than 1
simultaneously reflects views about the use of
government revenue in addition to views about
the optimal amount of redistribution. For
example, some may think that there are valuable
government projects that are not funded (such as
improving infrastructure or schools). In that case,
revenue is more valuable in the hands of the
government than in the hands of taxpayers,

29

For a rigorous explanation of these points, see Bas Jacobs, “The
Marginal Cost of Public Funds Is One at the Optimal Tax System,” 25
Int’l Tax & Pub. Fin. 1 (2018); and Louis Kaplow, “On the (Ir)relevance of
Distribution and Labor Supply Distortion to Public Goods Provision and
Regulation,” 18 J. Econ. Persp. 159 (2004).
28

See Keen and Slemrod, supra note 22, at 135.
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30

See Jacobs, supra note 29, at 21.
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implying g > 1. Others may think that the
government routinely wastes money, pursuing
projects (for example, the infamous “bridge to
31
nowhere” ) that produce benefits less than their
costs, implying g < 1.32
We are not in a position to make those
judgments, which require empirical data as well
as normative choices arrived at by politically
accountable actors. One may believe, for example,
that the government does not redistribute enough
and that there are valuable but unfunded
government projects, but the implications for g
are unclear because the two beliefs point in
opposite directions. The same is true if one
believes that the government redistributes too
much and that it is too big — the implications for
the value of g are ambiguous. Consequently, the
relevant actors — most likely Treasury and OMB
— need to carefully weigh the implications of a
choice of g. They may want to consider public
input into this question because it will have a
central effect on the cost-benefit analysis of tax
regulations.
Fourth, when making this choice, we suggest
that the transparency and stability of the resulting
cost-benefit analysis method be central
considerations. Transparency in cost-benefit
analysis makes agencies clearly state the effects of
their actions, allowing politically accountable
officials within the executive branch, members of
Congress, and the public to understand what
33
agencies are doing and to monitor their actions.
Transparency supports separately stating the
efficiency, distributional, and revenue effects of a
regulation rather than combining those effects
into a single measure. The MRR can be used to
estimate the efficiency effects by setting g = 1:
Only revenue changes resulting from behavioral
and reporting changes alter total resources. Any
other value combines efficiency effects,
distributional effects, and revenue effects.
Moreover, separately stating the efficiency and

31

See William Safire, “On Language: Bridge to Nowhere,” The New
York Times Magazine, Oct. 8, 2006.
32

Note that a regulation that increases transfers from taxpayers to the
government will not necessarily affect total spending. That is because
the additional revenue may instead be used to reduce other taxes,
holding overall spending constant.

distributional effects of a regulation is consistent
with Circular A-4. It instructs: “Your regulatory
analysis should provide a separate description of
distributional effects . . . so that decision makers
can properly consider them along with the effects
on economic efficiency.”
Under this approach, the MRR would be
estimated setting g = 1. The distributional and
revenue effects would be estimated the same way
that they are for tax legislation. Note that the
estimates of the distributional effects and revenue
effects of a regulation apply to all changes in
payments, including those resulting from pure
transfers as well as those resulting from changes
in behavior and reporting.
The stability of g over time and across
administrations is also an important
consideration. Stability has several benefits. It
promotes transparency because it allows the
public to compare different cost-benefit analyses
over time. It promotes effective cost-benefit
analysis because analysts at Treasury, OIRA, or
other agencies would be using a single method
and could develop expertise in that method.
Stability also improves public confidence that tax
regulations are more than mere political choices.
Choosing a value of g that promotes stability —
one that people with different views about
redistribution and the size of government might
agree on as a compromise — is therefore an
important goal.
In the online Appendix, we suggest that these
considerations, and other related arguments,
support choosing a value of g equal to 1, but we
understand that not everyone will agree. Again,
the MRR is compatible with other values of g that
should be chosen by the appropriate institutional
actors.
C. Extensions and Discussion
The earlier examples illustrated the logic of
the MRR using relatively simple cases. We
consider additional issues raised by, as well as
limitations on the use of, the MRR.
1. Information requirements.
The MRR approach relies on information that
the federal government can already generate or
could quickly develop the ability to generate.

33

See Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, New Foundations of CostBenefit Analysis (2006).
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OTA provides revenue estimates of tax legislative
proposals.34 To implement the MRR, OTA can
apply the same models to regulations. Although
the MRR is not a revenue estimate because it
ignores changes in revenue that do not result from
behavioral and reporting changes, the relevant
revenue estimating techniques should be the
same. When, for example, OTA estimates the
revenue that will be raised from a legislative
enhancement of information reporting
requirements,35 it considers (A) the revenue that
will be raised from behavioral and reporting
changes, and (B) the revenue that will be raised
from the imposition of taxes and penalties on
taxpayers whose behavior and reporting do not
change. The MRR instructs Treasury and the IRS
to count A but not B among the social benefits.
Because Treasury already has the capacity to
estimate A + B, it presumably can estimate A
alone. OIRA could develop a similar expertise to
review Treasury’s cost-benefit analysis, either by
using OTA’s models or by developing its own.
The MRR also requires information about
compliance and administrative costs. Treasury
may now have less of this information because it
is not required for the agency’s revenue
estimating function. Information on compliance
costs may be particularly hard to estimate because
compliance costs are private costs, which are not
normally reported to the government. Any costbenefit analysis of tax regulations, however,
would also need this information, as would any
reasonable alternative to cost-benefit analysis,
because the compliance cost effects of regulations
are central to their evaluation. Indeed, a virtue of
requiring cost-benefit analysis of tax regulations
is that it will promote collection and consideration
of how regulations affect compliance and
36
administrative costs.

34

See, e.g., Treasury, “General Explanations of the Administration’s
Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue Proposals,” at 265-272 (Feb. 2016) (fiscal 2017
green book).
35

See id. at 269.

36

In theory, agencies already are required to produce some of this
information to comply with the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C.
sections 3501-3531, although that obligation is often honored in the
breach. See Government Accountability Office, “Paperwork Reduction
Act: Agencies Could Better Leverage Review Processes and Public
Outreach to Improve Burden Estimates” (July 2018).
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2. Discrete choice.
The earlier examples all considered cases in
which taxpayers could choose freely among a set
of options, such as hours worked or the amount of
income to report. Many choices, however, are
discrete. For example, many people will be unable
to set their work hours. Instead, they can choose
to work or not. Similarly, in a case we discuss later,
corporations must choose to either invert (that is,
to move their domicile to another country) or
keep their domicile in the United States. They
cannot invert just a little bit.
Our analysis extends to cases in which
taxpayers face discrete choices as long as there are
many taxpayers subject to the changed regulation.
If many taxpayers are subject to the changed
regulation, some will be on the border between
the two choices, evenly balanced between the two.
Others will be inframarginal, with a clear choice
between the two options. The change in the
regulation will cause marginal taxpayers — those
who were evenly balanced between the two
choices — to shift their behavior while not
affecting inframarginal taxpayers’ behavior.
We can apply the same analysis as earlier to
understand the costs and benefits of these effects.
Those who were on the margin and shift their
behavior as a result of the regulation experience
no loss in welfare, but their tax payments will
change. The MRR applies to those changes in
revenue. Inframarginal taxpayers may pay more
or less taxes because of the changed regulation.
Those changes are just transfers.
To illustrate: Imagine that there are many
taxpayers, each choosing between working fulltime in the formal sector and not working at all. A
taxpayer at the margin is indifferent between the
two options. A change to a regulation that nudges
the marginal taxpayer from not working to
working has no effect on that taxpayer’s utility but
generates a social benefit equal to the amount of
revenue raised. Those whose behavior is
unchanged by the new regulation —either
because they were working full-time already and
continue to do so or because they were not
working at all and continue not working — may
pay more or pay less tax, but those changes in tax
payments are transfers and do not count in the
cost-benefit analysis of the regulation.
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The same logic applies when each taxpayer
chooses between working full-time in the
informal sector and working full-time in the
formal sector. The taxpayer at the margin is one
for whom the two options are equally attractive,
and thus a shift from informal-sector labor to
formal-sector labor leaves the marginal taxpayer
just as well off as before. And the same applies to
inversions: The corporation at the margin is the
one for which inverting and not inverting are
equally attractive. A shift toward not inverting
leaves that corporation indifferent but may raise
revenue.
3. More than one margin.
In the earlier examples, we considered
regulations that affected only one choice, such as
the choice to work in the formal or informal sector
or to report or not report income. Many
regulations, however, will affect more than one
margin. For example, as we discuss in greater
detail later, rules regulating corporate inversions
directly affect the choice to invert or not, but they
may also affect the choice to incorporate in the
United States in the first place. And beyond the
inversion example, a rule designed to eliminate a
particular tax shelter will cause taxpayers to shift
away from that shelter but may also cause
taxpayers to shift toward other shelters.
If a regulation affects more than one margin,
the MRR should be applied to each. The logic of
the MRR — that those who shift behavior have no
change in their utility but do change their tax
payments — applies equally to each decision
when a regulation affects more than one decision.
The full MRR is simply the sum of the MRR as
applied to each margin.
4. Multiple tax bases.
Changes to tax regulations may cause
taxpayers to switch their activities to different tax
bases, such as from operating in a corporation to
operating in a partnership. The MRR treats those
changes as behavioral changes that affect real
resource use. The net revenue increase (decrease)
from taxpayers at the margin is a social benefit
(cost).
To illustrate, consider a taxpayer who works
10 hours at $100 an hour as an employee of an
enterprise. Assume that employees face a tax rate
of 30 percent, such that this taxpayer pays $300 in

37

total tax. Assume as well that the employee
could rearrange her affairs to qualify as an
independent contractor and would thereby
become eligible for a lower passthrough rate (for
simplicity, say a 20 percent rate). By doing so, she
would save $100 in taxes. However, qualifying as
an independent contractor would entail a real
resource cost of $100, so the taxpayer is indifferent
between the two options.
Now imagine that a new regulation makes it
slightly more attractive for the taxpayer to switch
from being an employee to an independent
contractor. Because the taxpayer was indifferent
between the two options before, the switch has no
first-order effect on her utility. Society, however, is
$100 worse off because of the switch because the
government now collects $100 less in taxes. The
MRR treats the reduction in revenue as a social
cost.38
5. Non-marginal changes to the law.
The logic behind the MRR has implicitly
assumed that the relevant change to the tax law
was small. This assumption lay behind the
argument that there are no direct effects on the
welfare of marginal taxpayers who shift their
behavior because of the change. Most regulatory
changes are indeed small enough that the MRR is
a reasonable estimate of the costs and benefits.
Even the most important regulations are modest
in comparison with the overall economy and the
size of the tax system. Indeed, as explained in
Section V.C, we think the MRR reasonably
captures the costs and benefits of one of the
largest regulatory changes in recent memory: the
2016 regulations restricting corporate inversions.
Even if a regulatory change is large enough to
have a first-order effect on the utility of taxpayers
who shift their behavior or reporting practices,
the MRR can shed light on the regulation’s costs
and benefits. To illustrate: Imagine that the tax
rate is 30 percent and that a large regulatory
change significantly increases the cost of

37

We thank Michael Schler for suggesting this example to us.

38

If the lower rate for independent contractors prompts the
individual to work more hours, the taxes that she pays on those
additional hours of work should count as a social benefit. For a further
explanation, see Hemel, Nou, and Weisbach, “Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Tax Regulations: A Case Study,” Medium: Whatever Source Derived
(July 27, 2018).
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sheltering income (for example, by raising the
penalty for failure to report or by making
detection more likely). The taxpayer previously at
the margin between reporting and not reporting
an additional $100 item of income will now
choose to report. That switch will have no firstorder effect on the marginal taxpayer’s utility, so
the additional $30 of taxes collected from that
taxpayer should count as a social benefit,
according to the MRR. But the regulatory change
may also affect the decision of a previously
inframarginal non-reporter — for example, a
taxpayer who could shelter an additional $100
item of income for a cost of only $29. If that
taxpayer switches from not reporting to reporting
as a result of the regulatory change, revenue
increases by $30 but the taxpayer’s utility
decreases by $1. The net social benefit thus is not
$30 but $29 (the $30 in additional revenue minus
the $1 loss of utility for the taxpayer). In this case,
the MRR gives us an upper-bound estimate of the
social benefit of the resulting revenue increase.
For large regulatory changes that lead to shifts
in the opposite direction, the analysis is
symmetrical. Imagine the same setup as before
except that now the regulatory change
significantly reduces the penalty for failing to
report or significantly reduces the probability of
detection. Now, the regulatory change may affect
the decision of a previously inframarginal
reporter — for example, a taxpayer who would
have been indifferent between sheltering an
additional $100 item of income and paying a tax of
$31. If that taxpayer switches from reporting to
not reporting as a result of the regulatory change,
revenue falls by $30 but the social loss is $31. In
that case, the MRR gives us a lower-bound
estimate of the social cost of the resulting revenue
reduction.
6. Corners.
The MRR requires taxpayers to be at the
margin between different activities so that
making a small change in behavior has no firstorder effect on their utility. In some cases, a
taxpayer may be doing as much of, or as little of,
an activity as possible and therefore is not
indifferent between one more or one fewer unit of
that activity. A regulation that causes the taxpayer
to shift away from his previous choice of activities

1518

may have first-order effects on his utility. The
logic of the MRR does not apply in this context.
For example, suppose a taxpayer shelters all of
a particular type of income and that a new
regulation is issued that forces him to report some
or all of that income. The shift in his behavior —
reporting income — will reduce his utility
because previously he was not indifferent
between reporting and not reporting.
The extent to which there are corners depends
in part on how one defines the relevant activity. A
taxpayer engaging in, say, a tax shelter of type 1
may not engage in any of type 2 and therefore
could be said to be in a corner. But if we think of
that taxpayer as optimizing tax sheltering more
generally, he would be indifferent between a little
bit more sheltering and a little bit less. We suspect
that in most cases, estimates of the MRR can be
made workable using approaches like this.
7. Nontax rules.
Finally, note that the MRR applies to any
regulation that affects tax collections, not just to
tax regulations. For example, a regulation that
reduces or increases employment may affect the
taxes paid on earnings. To illustrate, consider a
regulation that reduces employment-related
expenses by making commuting less costly. Some
individuals who previously did not work will
now decide to work. Because they were on the
margin before the enactment of the new
regulation, they are indifferent after the new
regulation but now pay additional taxes. The
MRR applies to those individuals: The regulation
generates a net social benefit that should be
included in its cost-benefit analysis even though it
is not a tax regulation. As earlier, the net increase
in revenue resulting from behavioral changes
should be added to other non-revenue-related
social benefits (for example, environmental
benefits from a regulation that makes public
transportation more attractive than commuting
by car, or health benefits from a regulation that
makes bicycle commuting more attractive than
other alternatives). Those social benefits should
then be compared with the regulation’s social
costs.
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IV. Evaluating Alternatives
While we think that the MRR is the
appropriate way for cost-benefit analysis to
account for revenue effects in most tax regulatory
contexts, it is not the only possible approach.
Here, we evaluate two alternatives: one that
focuses on the marginal benefit of public projects,
and a second that applies a cost-effectiveness
analysis approach. We explain why we believe the
MRR is preferable to both those alternatives.
A. Marginal Benefit of Public Projects
The marginal benefit of public projects (MBP)
refers to the net social value of an additional
dollar of government expenditures. The MBP is
the spending-side analogue to the marginal cost
of funds (MCF), which refers to the net social cost
of raising an additional dollar of government
revenue. The MBP approach posits that the
government should raise revenue up to the point
at which the net social benefit of an additional
dollar of public spending equals the net social cost
of raising an additional dollar through taxation or
39
other instruments.
As applied to the cost-benefit analysis of tax
regulations, the MBP approach would account for
revenue raised as a result of regulatory actions by
multiplying the increase in revenue by an
estimate of the MBP, and then by including the
direct cost to taxpayers on the cost side of the
ledger. For example, if the MBP is 1.25, a
regulation that raises an additional $100 million of
revenue would yield a benefit of $125 million,
plus any non-revenue benefits that the regulation
generates (for example, health benefits of a
cigarette tax, or environmental benefits of a gas
tax). Those benefits would then be weighed
against the $100 million direct cost to taxpayers,
plus administrative costs, compliance costs, and
other social costs of the regulation.
Although the apparent simplicity of the MBP
approach might seem attractive, it suffers from
serious flaws. First and foremost, the MBP
approach fails to capture the real social benefits of
behavioral and reporting changes that result in

greater revenue. As emphasized in Section III,
when a taxpayer at the margin between not
reporting and reporting an additional item of
income shifts toward reporting, the resulting
revenue increase is a pure social benefit, even
when the marginal social value of an additional
dollar in the government’s hands equals the
marginal social value of an additional dollar in
private pockets. And so too when a taxpayer at
the margin shifts from informal-sector to formalsector work or from leisure to labor. To treat these
reporting and behavioral changes the same way
as mechanical transfers from taxpayers to the
government would be to miss the fact that from a
social welfare perspective, they are not the same.
Moreover, the MBP approach treats mere
transfers from taxpayers to the government as
having positive net value: $1 taken from a
taxpayer and given to the government is, under
the numbers we used earlier, worth $1.25. This is
inconsistent with the approach of Circular A-4. It
also has a strong ideological valence: It implies
that additional government spending improves
social welfare, which is not a view that all
administrations will share.
Finally, the net social value of an additional
dollar of government spending is virtually
impossible to estimate. If the federal government
raised an additional dollar, or an additional $100
million, what would Congress do with the extra
funds? Would it cut taxes (and if so, which taxes,
and on whom)? Would it increase spending (and
if so, on what)? Would it reduce the deficit (and if
so, what is the social benefit of debt reduction)?
Will the answers to these questions change based
on the partisan alignment of the executive and
legislative branches (that is, should Treasury, the
IRS, and OIRA use a lower estimate for the MBP
when Congress is controlled by the opposition
party and when the president thinks that
Congress’s spending priorities are warped)? As
noted earlier, this would undermine the policy
stability benefits of cost-benefit analysis and
entangle cost-benefit analysis in ideological
battles.
B. Cost-Effectiveness Analysis

39

On the MBP approach, see generally Slemrod and Shlomo Yitzhaki,
“Integrating Expenditure and Tax Decisions: The Marginal Cost of
Funds and the Marginal Benefit of Projects,” 54 Nat’l Tax J. 189 (2001).

A second alternative to the MRR is costeffectiveness analysis. Under this approach, the
analyst takes as given an objective (that is, transfer
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$X from A to B) and then seeks to identify the least
socially costly means of achieving that objective.40
Circular A-4 explains that “cost-effectiveness
analysis is designed to compare a set of regulatory
actions with the same primary outcome.”41
Imagine, for example, that Congress decides to
distribute $100 million to victims of a terrorist
attack. Cost-effectiveness analysis would seek to
determine the most efficient way of moving $100
million from government coffers to the intended
beneficiaries, without second-guessing
Congress’s decision to engage in that transfer.
Cost-effectiveness analysis of tax regulations
might proceed along similar lines.
Executive Order 12866 and the April 2018
memorandum of agreement mandate that
Treasury and the IRS apply cost-benefit analysis,
and cost-effectiveness analysis is not at all the
same as cost-benefit analysis. A regulation may be
the most effective way to achieve a given goal, but
it may still fail cost-benefit analysis because
achieving that goal, even through the best way
possible, may produce costs that are greater than
the benefits. Resorting to cost-effectiveness
analysis might be warranted when there is no
feasible procedure for performing cost-benefit
analysis, but as we showed earlier, cost-benefit
analysis of tax regulations is straightforward in
most circumstances.
Moreover, resorting to cost-effectiveness
analysis does not help regulators weigh the
benefits of additional revenue-raising against
administrative costs, compliance costs, and other
social costs. Circular A-4 itself reflects this point.
While noting that “cost-effectiveness analysis can
provide a rigorous way to identify options that
achieve the most effective use of the resources
available without requiring monetization of all of
relevant benefits or costs,” it goes on to warn that
cost-effectiveness analysis “becomes more
difficult to interpret” when “there is more than
one measure of effectiveness to incorporate in the
analysis.”42 For example, Treasury may have a
choice between a regulatory option that raises the
most revenue and a regulatory option that does

the most to reduce administrative and compliance
costs. Cost-effectiveness analysis offers no
guidance on how to evaluate those trade-offs.
To illustrate: The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (P.L.
115-97) added section 199A, which provides a 20
percent deduction for the qualified business
income of some passthrough businesses (that is,
partnerships, S corporations, and sole
proprietorships). The law states that qualified
business income does not include income from
performing services as an employee or
“reasonable compensation paid to the taxpayer by
any qualified trade or business of the taxpayer for
43
services rendered.” The law also states that
Treasury “shall prescribe such regulations as are
necessary to carry out the purposes of this section,
including regulations . . . for requiring or
44
restricting the allocation of items and wages.”
These provisions have given rise to the
question: Should Treasury require partnerships
and sole proprietorships to pay a reasonable wage
to partners-proprietors who provide services to
45
the partnership-proprietorship? (Treasury
already imposes a similar requirement for S
corporation shareholders.) The text and
legislative history of new section 199A are largely
silent on this. Clearly, a regulation requiring
partnerships and sole proprietorships to pay a
reasonable wage to their service partnersproprietors will raise revenue because it will
reduce the amount of income eligible for the 20
percent deduction. Just as clearly, a regulation
that explicitly exempts partnerships and sole
proprietorships from the requirement to pay a
reasonable wage to their service partnersproprietors will reduce administrative and
compliance costs because it will avoid entangling
taxpayers and the IRS in fact-intensive disputes
over what wage should be considered reasonable.
To say that Treasury should choose the more costeffective option still requires it to weigh the
revenue-related benefits of a reasonable wage
requirement against the various costs.

43
40

See Posner, “Transfer Regulations and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis,”
53 Duke L.J. 1067 (2003).
41

Circular A-4, at 10-11.

42

Id. at 11-12.
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Section 199A(c)(4) and (d)(1)(B).
Section 199A(f)(4).

45

Proposed regulations published by Treasury and the IRS in August
do not extend the reasonable wage requirement to partnerships and sole
proprietorships. See REG-107892-18.
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The MRR, by contrast, does provide
regulators with guidance. The MRR instructs that
the social benefit of revenue generated by a
reasonable wage requirement is equal to the net
increase in revenue resulting from behavioral or
reporting changes. There are at least three ways in
which a reasonable wage requirement would
affect taxpayer behavior and reporting. First, by
reducing the tax benefit of earning qualified
business income, it would cause more taxpayers
to work as employees (who are ineligible for the
qualified business income benefit) rather than
independent contractors (who generally are
eligible). Second, by reducing the benefit of being
a partnership or sole proprietorship relative to a C
corporation, the regulation would cause more
enterprises to organize as C corporations rather
than as partnerships or sole proprietorships.
Third, by increasing the effective tax rate on
partnerships and sole proprietorships, it would
cause participants in those enterprises to work
less, invest less, and report less. The MRR directs
Treasury, the IRS, and OIRA to count the net
increase in revenue from taxpayers who respond
along these margins as a social benefit; that
benefit, along with any non-revenue benefit, can
then be compared with the total social cost. The
MRR offers a tractable analytical framework
when cost-effectiveness analysis does not.
A final problem with cost-effectiveness
analysis is choosing the goal to be achieved in the
most cost-effective manner. The results of a costeffectiveness analysis will depend on whether the
goal is framed broadly or narrowly. At the
broadest level, Treasury could seek to raise a
given amount of revenue in the most costeffective manner (for example, the most costeffective way to raise $3.3 trillion). More narrowly,
Treasury could seek to raise a given amount of
revenue from a particular set of taxpayers or a
particular type of entity in the most cost-effective
manner (for example, the most cost-effective way
to raise a specified sum from C corporations). Or
Treasury might set an even narrower goal of
taxing a particular type of transaction in the most
cost-effective way (for example, the most costeffective way to raise a given amount of revenue
from corporate mergers and acquisitions). Or it
might seek to find the most cost-effective way to
pursue a very particular goal of a code section or

subsection (for example, the most cost-effective
way to allow tax-free reorganizations). Each of
these approaches will likely yield different
results. Cost-effectiveness analysis provides no
way to determine the level of generality at which
the overarching goal should be chosen.
V. Applications
This section illustrates the application of the
MRR through three examples: a proposal to adjust
the reporting threshold for winnings from specific
gambling activities, the centralized partnership
audit rules adopted by Treasury and the IRS in
46
January, and regulations addressing corporate
inversion transactions. These examples show that
the MRR can guide cost-benefit analysis for a
wide range of tax regulatory actions.
A. Winnings From Bingo, Keno, and Slots
Section 6041 provides that all persons
engaged in a trade or business who make
payments to another person of $600 or more in a
year shall (with some exceptions not relevant
here) file an information return with the IRS
reporting the amount of the payment and the
name and address of the recipient. Since 1977
Treasury and the IRS have set higher reporting
thresholds for payments of winnings from bingo,
keno, and slot machine play ($1,200 for bingo and
slot machines, $1,500 for keno). In 2015 Treasury
and the IRS requested comments from the public
regarding the possibility of repealing those higher
thresholds and requiring information returns for
all payments of $600 and above.47 Several
commentators suggested that the regulations
could reduce casino profits by more than $100
million a year.48 Under the new Treasury-OMB
memorandum of agreement, that regulation
could thus be considered economically

46
47

T.D. 9829.
REG-132253-11, 80 F.R. 11600, 11601 (Mar. 4, 2015).

48

See Howard Stutz, “Lower Trigger for Jackpots Seen as Costly for
Casinos,” Las Vegas Review-Journal, Mar. 12, 2015; Statista, “Number of
Commercial Casinos in the United States From 2015 to 2016” Statista;
comments of American Gaming Association (July 31, 2015); and
comments of Joseph H. Webster (on behalf of Lytton Rancheria of
California, a casino-operating tribe).
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significant. (Treasury and the IRS ultimately
decided not to modify the reporting thresholds.49)
The MRR provides a practicable framework
for quantifying the costs and benefits of lower
reporting thresholds for bingo, keno, and slot
machine winnings. Taxpayers with bingo, keno,
and slot machine winnings include inframarginal
evaders (that is, those who will not report
winnings regardless of whether the casino files an
information return, or who will report winnings
but claim offsetting deductions for phantom
losses), inframarginal compliers (that is, those
who will report winnings honestly and pay taxes
accordingly even if the casino does not file an
information return), and marginal taxpayers (that
is, those who will evade if the casino does not file
a return but will comply if it does). The MRR
instructs that the additional revenue raised from
marginal taxpayers — those who shift from not
reporting to reporting their bingo, keno, and slot
machine winnings as a result of the regulation —
be treated as a social benefit.
The social costs of the lower reporting
threshold include the compliance costs borne by
casinos in filing the returns as well as the
administrative costs borne by the IRS in
processing them. Although casinos may be able to
pass some of those costs on to customers, if
regulators agree with our argument that $1
should be weighted the same regardless of who
holds it, these costs count the same whether borne
by the casinos or by their customers.
Distributional effects, although potentially
relevant to the agency’s ultimate decision, should
be stated separately.
The reporting regulations not only affect the
decision of bingo, keno, and slot machine players
to report their income but also may raise the
effective tax rate on those activities compared
with other gambling, and on gambling compared
with other forms of recreation. This will cause
some individuals to shift their behavior. The MRR
applies to these shifts in behavior as well. For
example, if people shift away from gambling, they
may pay lower taxes because we tax gambling
winnings but limit the deductibility of gambling

losses. That reduction in taxes would reduce the
benefit of the regulations.50
The regulations also may affect state revenues
from gambling, either because they change
participation in state-sponsored gambling or
because they affect state revenue from taxes on
gambling. Cost-benefit analysis does not
differentiate who receives benefits and who bears
costs, so changes to state revenues are counted
under the MRR the same way as changes to
federal revenue.
Finally, gambling activities may generate
externalities — positive or negative — within and
51
beyond the jurisdictions in which they occur. We
take no position on the welfare effects of gambling
apart from the revenue-related effects. The former
would be included in the regulatory impact
analysis in standard ways. The key point for our
purposes is that there is no conceptual difference
between non-revenue externalities arising from
tax regulations and non-revenue externalities
arising from other rules.
Treasury and the IRS already have — or can
easily acquire — the ability to generate most or all
of the estimates necessary for a comprehensive
cost-benefit analysis of lower reporting
thresholds for bingo, keno, and slot machine
winnings. For example, in 1997 Treasury
estimated that a separate proposal to impose new
withholding obligations on casinos for bingo and
keno winnings would raise $24 million in revenue
52
over five years. While the 2015 request for
comments focused on information returns rather
than withholding obligations, the same tools used
to generate revenue estimates in one context can
be applied to the other. Data on the marginal cost
of processing additional information returns
already exist within Treasury and the IRS. And
the challenge of calculating the compliance costs
borne by the gambling industry is no more

50

Gains from wagering transactions are included in income for all
taxpayers, but wagering losses are deductible only for individuals who
forgo the standard deduction (and then only up to the extent of
wagering gains). See section 165(d). Thus, for most taxpayers, the code’s
treatment of wagering gains and losses amounts to a “heads I win, tails
we tie” arrangement from the perspective of the federal fisc.
51

For an overview, see Ricardo Gazel, “The Economic Impacts of
Casino Gambling at the State and Local Levels,” 556 Annals Am. Acad.
Political & Social Sci. 66 (1998).
52

49

See T.D. 9807.
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Louis Lyons and Fred Stokeld, “Gaming Industry, Hill Allies Bet
Against Bingo-Keno Withholding,” Tax Notes, Mar. 17, 1997, p. 1372.
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difficult than, for example, estimating the
compliance costs borne by automobile
manufacturers as a result of new safety
regulations or the compliance costs borne by
electric utilities as a result of new emissions
standards. Beyond the challenge of translating
revenue effects into welfare effects (a challenge
that the MRR addresses), cost-benefit analysis of
tax regulations poses no unique difficulties for the
executive branch.
B. Centralized Partnership Audit Rules
While the previous example involved a
regulatory action that Treasury and the IRS
decided not to undertake, we also seek to
illustrate the MRR’s application to rules that have
been promulgated. A recent high-profile example
is the centralized partnership audit regime
regulations finalized in January.53 These rules
come as part of a comprehensive change in the
IRS’s approach to audits of partnerships, with
important implications for the taxation of
noncorporate business entities.
The passthrough system has presented the
IRS with challenges in partnership audits. Before
2018, if the IRS determined through an audit that
the partnership had understated its income, the
agency would then have to initiate separate
actions against each of the partnership’s members
to collect back taxes. This proved to be especially
cumbersome when a partnership had hundreds of
members.
With the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA),
Congress sought to streamline the assessment and
collection of back taxes following a partnership
audit. That law set out a centralized regime for
partnership audits and adjustments, scheduled to
take effect in 2018. Under the new centralized
regime, the IRS can assess and collect taxes at the
partnership level, even if the partners at the time
of assessment and collection are different than the
partners who failed to pay the proper amount in
taxes. A partnership also has the option of
pushing out the underpayment to its partners
(that is, requiring the current partners rather than
the partnership itself to pay back taxes). Either
way, the IRS no longer needs to initiate separate

deficiency proceedings against individual
partners to collect back taxes.
Not all partnerships are subject to the new
centralized regime. The BBA states that
partnerships with 100 or fewer partners may elect
out of the centralized regime if each of those
partners is an eligible partner (an individual, C
corporation, foreign corporation, S corporation,
or estate of a deceased partner) and specified
other conditions are met.54 Congress did not,
however, specify all relevant details in the
election-out provisions. For example, it arguably
left some ambiguity on whether two partners who
are married and file a joint return should be
counted as two partners or one. Congress also
gave Treasury authority to expand the definition
of eligible partner to include additional entities
such as trusts, which would mean that more
partnerships would be able to elect out of the
55
centralized regime.
The January 2018 regulations seek to fill in
some of the details of the election-out regime. The
new rules state, for example, that two spouses
with separate interests in a partnership count as
two partners for purposes of the 100-or-fewer
threshold but that a second spouse who has only
a community property interest in a first spouse’s
partnership interest does not count as a separate
56
partner. The new rules also state that despite
several comments asking Treasury and the IRS to
include trusts within the definition of eligible
57
partners, partnerships with members that are
trusts will not be eligible to elect out of the
centralized regime.58 Other elements of the new
rules specify the steps that a partnership must
take when it elects out of the centralized regime
(for example, whether the election can be made on
an amended return, whether a partnership may
revoke its election, whether the partnership must
provide a taxpayer identification number for all
59
partners, and so on ). Treasury and the IRS have
not explained whether — or why — these and

54
55
56
57
58

53

59

See T.D. 9829.

Section 6221(b).
Section 6221(b)(2)(C).
Reg. section 301.6221(b)-1(b)(2)(iii), examples 1 and 2.
T.D. 9829, 83 F.R. 24, at 27 (Jan. 2, 2018).
Reg. section 301.6221(b)-1(b)(3)(ii)(B).
83 F.R. at 29-30.
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other choices in the new regulations are costjustified.
Although these regulations are highly
technical, their significance should not be
understated. In tax year 2014, partnerships filed
more than 3.6 million tax returns, and those
returns represented more than 27 million
60
partners. If the election-out procedures impose
just a few extra dollars in compliance costs per
partner, they would exceed the $100 million
annual-economic-effect threshold necessary to
trigger the requirement of a quantitative costbenefit analysis under the April memorandum of
agreement. Although it is not immediately clear
whether the regulations exceed that threshold, it
is certainly plausible that they could. If so, the
MRR approach would provide the appropriate
framework for evaluating the regulations’ costs
and benefits.
A decision to expand the scope of the
centralized regime (for example, to count spouses
as two partners rather than one and thereby bring
more partnerships above the 100-member
threshold, or to prevent partnerships with trusts
as members from electing out) affects revenue
through several channels. First, an expansion of
the centralized regime makes it easier for the IRS
to collect back taxes and penalties from
partnerships that have understated their liabilities
in the recent past. Payments of back taxes and
penalties certainly generate revenue — but not
through behavioral or reporting changes. Thus,
assuming regulators agree with our argument
that the value of g should be set to 1, payments of
back taxes and penalties should be considered
transfers rather than net social benefits or costs.
Second, partnerships that are subject to the
centralized regime presumably will be at least
somewhat less likely to evade taxes, given the
higher probability that the IRS will be able to
assess and collect back taxes and penalties. Insofar
as the centralized regime raises revenue through a
deterrence effect on partnerships that are subject
to its provisions, that is an increase in revenue
through behavioral or reporting changes. That
additional revenue should be counted as a benefit
for cost-benefit analysis purposes.

60

See IRS Statistics of Income, “Partnership Returns, 2014” (2016).
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Expanding the scope of the centralized regime
will not necessarily affect administrative costs. If
the IRS devotes the same amount of resources to
partnership audits and collections, its
administrative costs will neither rise nor fall. But
it will be able to conduct more audits overall
because it will be able to collect back taxes and
penalties more cost-effectively when a
partnership-level audit reveals an
understatement. That affects private sector
compliance costs in two ways. First, by reducing
the number of separate deficiency proceedings
each time the IRS seeks to collect from a
partnership and its partners, the centralized
regime cuts private sector compliance costs. But
second, because audits themselves impose
compliance costs on taxpayers, an increase in the
number of partnership audits under the
centralized regime would raise private sector
compliance costs. The net increase (or decrease) in
compliance costs as a result of the regime should
be counted as a social cost (or social benefit) of the
new regime.
Finally, the centralized regime creates
uncertainty for individuals and companies that
join an existing partnership, because now they are
potentially liable for back taxes and penalties
from prior years. Some potential partners will
invest resources in investigating the partnership’s
Form 1065 filings from prior years. The cost of that
investigation counts as a compliance cost. Others
may purchase insurance to protect themselves
against liability for understatements that
occurred before they joined the partnership. The
transaction costs associated with those insurance
purchases also count as social costs of the new
61
regime. Others may retain the risk of having to
pay back taxes and penalties. The disutility that
they experience from that risk (over and above the
risk-neutral expected value of potential liabilities)
also counts as a social cost.
OTA already has the ability to estimate the
social benefits from changes in revenue resulting
from the January 2018 regulations. It projected in

61

Note that the portion of insurance premiums that compensates the
insurer for expected claims is not a social cost because it is simply the
first step of the transfer from taxpayers to the government. Moreover,
any economic rents that accrue to the insurer should be considered
“within-private transfers” and not net social costs. See Chetty, supra note
21, at 44-45.
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2015 that streamlined audit and adjustment
procedures for partnerships — with an
opportunity for partnerships having 100 or fewer
members to elect out — would generate $2.407
billion in additional revenue over the following
62
decade. That projection reflects subsidiary
estimates of (1) the number of partnerships that
will be subject to the regime, (2) the expected
increase in revenue resulting from additional
back taxes and penalties paid by those
partnerships, and (3) the expected increase in
revenue resulting from behavioral and reporting
changes among those partnerships. Given those
existing estimation capabilities, OTA presumably
can produce estimates of the number of additional
partnerships that will be subject to the centralized
regime if, for example, spouses with separate
interests are counted as two partners rather than
one, as well as the revenue raised from those
additional partnerships (separating transfers
from revenue generated by behavioral and
reporting changes).
On the other side of the ledger, OTA can rely
on a convenient shortcut when estimating the
compliance costs of an incremental expansion of
the centralized regime’s scope. It can compare (A)
the price of an interest in a partnership that is not
subject to the centralized regime with (B) the price
of an interest in an otherwise-equivalent
partnership that is subject to the centralized
regime and (C) the risk-neutral expected value of
the additional back taxes and penalties to be paid
for prior years by a partnership subject to the
regime. The formula A - B - C represents the
reduction in the value of a partnership subject to
the centralized regime that is not merely a transfer
to the IRS. The increasingly liquid secondary
market in private equity interests would allow
OTA to compare prices for interests in
partnerships above and below the 100-or-fewer
threshold — in other words, to gauge the market’s
63
estimate of A - B. That information, combined
with the revenue-related estimates that OTA
already has produced, would allow for a

62

See, e.g., Treasury, “General Explanations of the Administration’s
Fiscal Year 2016 Revenue Proposals,” at 298 (Feb. 2015).

comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of the
January 2018 regulations.
C. Corporate Inversion Regulations
A corporate inversion is a transaction in which
a U.S.-based multinational corporation changes
its tax residence to another country by merging
with a smaller foreign company, thus avoiding
U.S. tax on its worldwide income. The name
“inversion” stems from the fact that in these
transactions, the smaller foreign company
technically acquires the larger U.S. corporation, so
that the U.S. corporation takes on the foreign
company’s tax residence. Although inversions
date back several decades, their pace picked up in
the 1990s, as a number of high-profile companies
— including technological manufacturer
Flextronics, consumer goods company Helen of
Troy, security firm Tyco International, and
underwear manufacturer Fruit of the Loom — all
changed their tax residence to lower-tax
jurisdictions (Singapore, Bermuda, Ireland, and
the Cayman Islands, respectively).64 Fearful that
these and other inversion transactions would
erode the U.S. corporate income tax base,
Congress responded in 2004 by adding an antiinversion statute, section 7874, to the code.
Section 7874 imposes a tax — at the normal
U.S. income tax rate — on the inversion gain of an
expatriated entity. The term “expatriated entity”
includes a U.S. corporation that is acquired by a
foreign corporation if, after the acquisition, at
least 60 percent of the stock of the combined entity
is held by former shareholders of the U.S.
corporation, unless the combined entity has
substantial business activities in the foreign
country where it is a tax resident.65 The term
“inversion gain” refers to any income received by
the expatriated entity because of transactions with
foreign related persons in the 10 years following
66
an inversion. A special rule applies when 80
percent or more of the stock of the combined
entity is held by former shareholders of the U.S.
corporation. In that case, the inversion is
disregarded altogether, and the combined entity

64
65

63

Cf. Chris Flood, “Private Equity ‘Secondaries’ Deals Hit Record
$58bn,” Financial Times, Feb. 25, 2018.

66

Bloomberg, “Tracking Tax Runaways” (last updated Mar. 1, 2017).
Section 7874(a).
Section 7874(d)(2).
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continues to be treated as a U.S. corporation
subject to U.S. tax.67
The enactment of section 7874 in 2004
temporarily slowed the pace of inversions. By
2012, however, their number reached an all-time
68
high. Treasury responded with a series of notices
and temporary regulations, none of which
69
stemmed the tide. Then, in April 2016, Treasury
issued a broad set of regulations seeking to
strengthen the section 7874 regime and to limit the
tax benefits from corporate expatriations.
These regulations came in two pieces. The first
was a set of regulations that targets groups that
have engaged in a series of inversions or
acquisitions (so-called serial inverters) and that
also restricts post-inversion asset dilution (a
technique for inverted corporations to avoid U.S.
tax).70 The second was a set of regulations aimed at
71
earnings-stripping transactions. These latter
regulations characterize some forms of relatedparty debt as equity, reducing interest deductions
by U.S. corporations. The two sets of regulations
were finalized at different times and therefore
would have been subject to separate cost-benefit
analysis. We focus here on the first set, those
focused directly on inversions, leaving aside the
debt-equity regulations.
The inversion regulations were complex, and
a complete examination of their details is beyond
the scope of our inquiry. A full cost-benefit
analysis of these regulations would have to delve
into the details. For our purposes of
demonstrating the MRR, we can think of the
regulations as broadly raising the costs of
inverting, and then we can analyze the costs and
benefits of that general approach.
The regulations have effects on multiple
margins. Each margin should be analyzed using
the MRR: In each case, we want to know how the
regulations affected tax payments by marginal
taxpayers and how they changed overall

compliance and administrative costs (for
everyone, not just marginal taxpayers).
The first, and most central, margin is that the
regulations made it more difficult for companies
to invert. After the regulations were issued,
several companies that had previously
announced inversions either canceled them or
changed their plans. Those marginal taxpayers
included, most prominently, Pfizer, which
canceled its intended merger with Allergan, an
Irish company. The Congressional Research
Service reports that acquisitions of U.S.
companies by foreigners, which rose substantially
in 2015, fell by 15 percent in 2016. Focusing on
countries associated with inversions, such as
Ireland, merger volume fell from $176 billion in
72
2015 to $35 billion in 2016.
Nevertheless, some companies decided to
invert despite the new regulations. These
inframarginal inverters include
biopharmaceutical company Baxalta, which
merged with Shire (an Irish company); electronics
manufacturer Johnson Controls, which merged
with Tyco (a previously inverted company now
based in Ireland); and Burger King, which merged
with Tim Hortons (a Canadian-based chain
specializing in coffee and donuts).
Most corporations are inframarginal noninverters — that is, they will retain U.S. tax
residence even in the absence of the anti-inversion
regulations. For example, the CEO of U.S.-based
pharmaceutical company Merck said in
September 2014 that his company would not
pursue an inversion transaction because “the size
of transactions that would make [Merck] eligible
for an inversion” would be inconsistent with the
company’s strategy of buying smaller companies
based on their commercial and scientific
potential.73
The MRR treats the additional corporate taxes
paid by those who otherwise would have inverted
but did not as a gain. This is based on the
assumption that for the marginal inverters, the

67

Section 7874(b).

68

Michelle Clark Neely and Larry D. Sherrer, “A Look at Corporate
Inversions, Inside and Out,” The Regional Economist, at 1, 2, and fig. 2 (1st
quarter 2017).

72

69

Donald Marples and Jane Gravelle, “Corporate Expatriation,
Inversions, and Mergers: Tax Issues,” Congressional Research Service, at
3 (Aug. 17, 2017).

70

Eric Palmer, “Merck’s Frazier Disses Tax Inversion Strategy, at Least
for Merck,” FiercePharma, Sept. 10, 2014 (quoting Merck CEO Ken
Frazier).

See T.D. 9592 (temporary regulations codified at reg. section 1.78743T(b)(1)-(3) (2012)); Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 IRB 712; and Notice 2015-79,
2015-49 IRB 775.
T.D. 9761.

71

REG-108060-15; T.D. 9790.
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benefits of inversion approximate the costs. Those
costs include additional foreign taxes, transaction
74
costs associated with a multinational merger,
and the cost of integrating the U.S. and foreign
companies after the inversion.75 For a company at
the margin between inverting and not inverting,
76
these benefits and costs roughly balance, so costbenefit analysis can focus on the net increase in
revenue. Note, though, that insofar as the
regulation results in more revenue from
inframarginal inverters (for example, because
those companies now must pay the special tax on
inversion gain), that revenue should be
considered a transfer rather than a net social
benefit or cost.
The second margin affected by the regulations
is the choice of where to incorporate. By reducing
the opportunity for inversions, the regulations
increased the effective tax rate on U.S.
corporations. As a result, some new businesses
that might otherwise have incorporated in the
United States will incorporate elsewhere. That is,
if you are a new business and you now know that
you will be unable to invert in the future, you
might incorporate abroad from the start so that
you never need to invert. Revenue losses from
that shift away from U.S. incorporation should be
counted as a cost of the regulations.
The inversion regulations may affect revenue
through other channels as well. For example, they
will change the market for corporate control,
favoring domestic purchasers and large foreign
purchasers over smaller foreign companies
seeking to acquire U.S. businesses. The
regulations also may encourage some U.S.
corporations to slim down so that it is easier for
them to invert in the future. And by shutting
down one strategy for reducing taxes, the
74

See, e.g., Drew FitzGerald and Sam Goldfarb, “AT&T’s Tab
Awaiting Time Warner Takeover Hits $1.4 Billion,” The Wall Street
Journal, Apr. 26, 2018; and Nathan Layne and Michael Flaherty,
“Olympus’s $687 Billion Advisory Fee Sets M&A Record,” Reuters, Oct.
21, 2011.
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CBO, “An Analysis of Corporate Inversions,” at 4-5 (Sept. 2017).
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Pfizer’s share price actually increased 1.6 percent overnight after
the 2016 anti-inversion regulations were announced — an indication that
at least from investors’ perspective, the benefits of the inversion were, at
a minimum, roughly in the same range as the costs. See Pfizer,
“Historical Price Lookup” (compare closing price on April 4, 2016, with
opening price on April 5, 2016). The company’s shares rose an additional
5 percent on the day that Pfizer and Allergan officially called off the
deal. See Nathan Bomey and Kevin McCoy, “$160 Billion Pfizer, Allergan
Inversion Scrapped,” USA Today, Apr. 6, 2016.

inversion regulations make other strategies
relatively more attractive.
The MRR adds up the revenue effects from
these various margins. The net benefit must then
be reduced by any increase in compliance costs
because of the regulations (or increased by any
reduction in compliance costs). Note that because
the MRR assumes that marginal taxpayers are
roughly indifferent between the two relevant
alternatives (here, not inverting versus inverting),
the nontax costs of inversions — such as
transaction costs associated with a merger — need
not be accounted for separately. Those costs are,
by hypothesis, equal to the revenue raised from
behavioral changes; to count transaction cost
savings as a social benefit would amount to
double-counting.
The inversion regulations will likely have
effects in foreign countries as well. For example,
by reducing inversions, the regulations may
reduce tax revenue received by foreign
governments. Circular A-4 is ambiguous on how
to treat effects in foreign countries. Although this
is important, it is not a tax-specific problem and
thus does not demand a tax-specific solution.
Regulations in many contexts have cross-border
effects.
Again, the inputs into a cost-benefit analysis
of these regulations lie within Treasury’s existing
estimation capabilities. OTA has on prior
occasions produced revenue estimates of other
changes to inversion rules, such as a legislative
proposal under the Obama administration that
would have lowered the 80 percent threshold
under section 7874 to a 50 percent threshold (that
is, it would have applied U.S. corporate income
tax to the worldwide income of any entity formed
through the merger of a U.S. corporation and a
foreign corporation if, after the merger, more than
50 percent of the stock in the combined entity
were held by former shareholders of the U.S.
corporation).77 OTA estimated that the proposal
would generate $13.39 billion in additional
78
revenue over the next decade. OTA presumably
can apply the same method that it used to
estimate the revenue effects of that proposal when

77
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See fiscal 2017 green book, supra note 34, at 28.
Id. at 265.
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estimating the various revenue effects (positive
and negative) of the 2016 anti-inversion
regulations. After separating the revenue effects
from behavioral changes and the revenue effects
from inframarginal inverters, OTA would have
almost all the inputs to the cost-benefit calculation
79
outlined earlier.
VI. Conclusion
Treasury and the IRS will have to continue to
prepare regulatory impact analyses for
economically significant tax regulations subject to
OIRA review under the April 2018 framework. In
doing so, they will have to decide how to account
for the revenue effects of tax regulations within a
cost-benefit analysis framework. The MRR offers
a solution: Net increases in revenue resulting
from behavioral and reporting changes should be
counted as social benefits, while additional
revenues raised from inframarginal taxpayers
should be treated as transfers that do not change
the total resources available to society. Revenuerelated benefits estimated according to the MRR
should be added to non-revenue social benefits of
the regulation, and those benefits should be
weighed against the administrative costs,
compliance costs, and other social costs that the
regulation is expected to generate.
The MRR is consistent with the principles
underlying Circular A-4, the document that has
guided agencies in their preparation of regulatory
impact analyses for the past 15 years. It allows
Treasury, the IRS, and OIRA to avoid ideologically
contentious questions about the desirability of
additional government spending, it leverages
revenue estimating capabilities that already exist
within the federal government, and it is firmly
rooted in economic theory. Moreover, as
illustrated by the applications discussed in this
report, it is a practicable approach that Treasury,
the IRS, and OIRA can implement. A range of
recently contemplated and promulgated
regulations — including actions related to the
reporting of gambling winnings, centralized

audits of large partnerships, and the tax treatment
of corporate inversion transactions — are
candidates for analysis under the MRR.
Treasury and the IRS should adopt the MRR
explicitly. The Internal Revenue Manual’s
instructions to IRS drafting teams regarding
regulatory impact analyses would be an
appropriate vehicle for the agency to convey this
80
guidance. OIRA could assist Treasury and the
IRS by issuing a memorandum announcing that it
will apply the MRR in its review of tax
regulations. With those measures, Treasury, the
IRS, and OIRA can help ensure that cost-benefit
analysis serves as a useful aid in the development
of tax regulatory policy.
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In July Treasury issued rules that finalized some temporary
elements of the April 2016 inversion regulations. In the preamble,
Treasury said that “given the limited nature of the changes made by
these final regulations,” the final regulations “are not economically
significant under Executive Order 12866.” T.D. 9834, 83 F.R. 32524, at
32532 (July 12, 2018).

1528

80

See IRM section 32.1.5.4.7.5.3.
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